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NOTES
WATER AND WATERCOURSES - SOIL UNDER MARGINAL
SEAS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE SLIDING
INTEREST DOCTRINE
A hundred and twenty-nine years ago Chief Justice Marshall said,
"there are not many questions in which a State would be supposed
to taie a deeper or more immediate interest than in those which
decide on the extent of her territory."' His statement is as timely
today as it was then. In the so-called tidelands cases the United
States Supreme Court decided that the Federal Government has
"paramount rights in and power over" the submerged lands off the
coasts of California,2 Louisiana,3 and Texas 4 In view of the wide-
spread criticism these decisions have received it is worthwhile to
exmmine the reasoning of the Court in these cases to ascertain if it
would be applicable to lands under the marginal seas of the original
thirteen states5 that border on the Atlantic Ocean.8
By the common law the shore of the sea, and the arms of the
sea, is the land between ordinary high and low watermark, the land
over which the daily tides ebb and flow.7 ,The "seashore" has been
denominated as that well-defined area lying between high water-
mark and low watermark of waters in which the tide daily ebbs and
flows.8 There is general agreement among authorities as to what
constitutes the shore or seashore. Agreement in distinguishing be-
tween the shore and tidelands is another matter and the two terms
are often used synonymously. Tideland has variously been defined
as: Land over which the tide ebbs and flows ;9 land alternately
covered and uncovered and between the dry upland and the navigable
water which may be used in facilitating approach to the navigable
waters from the upland;1O land that is covered and uncovered by
L Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
2. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947).
3. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 669 (1950).
4. United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950).
5. Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachu-
setts, M aryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North
Carolina and Rhode Island. (Listed in the order of ratification of the Consti-
tution.)
6. Pennsylvania does not border on the Atlantic Ocean.
7. United States v. Pacheco, 2 Wall. 587, 590 (U. S. 1865); Borax Consoli-
dated v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 22 (1935).
8. Mr. Justice Stone in Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U. S. 65, 92 (1926).
9. Woodvard v. Davidson, 150 Fed. 840 (C. C. W. D. Wash. 1907).
10. Mr. Justice Brewer in Baer v. Moran, 153 U. S. 287, 288 (1894).
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the ordinary daily tides of public navigable waters;" land that ex-
tends to high watermark;12 land that has a definite boundary at
the line of mean low-tide.' 3 Shore lands differ from tidelands not
only in their situation, which in many cases makes an almost inde-
finite filling in of the latter a possibility, but also in legal definition.'
4
Since the shore and tideland are both lands covered by flood tide,
one way to distinguish the two is that just given: capability of being
filled in or reclaimed to facilitate access to navigable water. Even
this distinction is faulty inasmuch as soil under a shallow marginal
sea may be reclaimed by filling in.15 Although "tideland" in its
popular usage includes land under the sea beyond low watermark,
it should be remembered that the Government did not acquire
the tidelands in the strict sense of the word under the decisions of
the instant cases. Popular usage16 of the term tidelands, which in-
cludes the marginal sea lands, should not obscure the fact that prior
decisions of the Court in respect to the tidelands remain substantially
the same. The terms tidelands and marginal sea lands will be used
in their legal distinctions herein. The tidelands and marginal sea
lands both begin at the line of mean low tide; the former extending
toward the upland and the latter extending seaward. Unless other-
wise indicated the word "government" used herein denotes Federal
Government.
L
TITLE AND INTERESTS AcQUMrED BY THE STATES
The English possessions in America were not claimed by right
of conquest but by right of discovery.' 7 Charters granted by the
kings of England for territory on the Atlantic coast conveyed to the
grantees both the territory described and the powers of government,
including the property and the dominion of lands under tidewaters.18
In those governments which were denominated royal where the
11. Miller v. Bay-To-Gulf, 141 Fla. 452, 193 So. 425 (1940).
12. Borax Consolidated v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 22 (1935).
13. Mr. Justice Brandeis in Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington Rail-
road, 255 U. S. 56, 66 (1921) (Here the state had defined the tidelands by
statute.)
14. Ibid.
15. 3. MiAmi L. Q. 339 (Deals with the filling in practices at Miami Beach,
FI.)
16. An example of the popular usage of this term is seen in a previous issue
of this Quarterly where the author says: "The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that no state has any title to the natural resources under tidal
waters." 5 S. C. L. Q. 131 (Dec. 1952).
17. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 409 (U. S. 1842).
18. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).
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right "o the soil was not vested in individuals but remained in the
Crown or was vested in the colonial government, the king could
grant lands and dismember the government at will. Subsequent
grants made out of the two original colonies are examples of this.
The governments of New England, New York, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Maryland, and a part of Carolina, were thus created. Al-
most every title within those governments is dependent on these
grants. These various patents cannot be considered as nullities nor
can they be limited to a mere grant of the powers of government.
A charter intended to convey political power only would never
contain words expressly granting the land, the soil and the waters. 19
The Indians inhabited the lands claimed by the English by right
of discovery. According to the principles of international law as
then understood by the civilized powers of Europe the Indian tribes
in the new world were regarded as mere temporary occupants of the
soil and the absolute rights of property and dominion were held to
belong to the European nation by which any particular portion of
the country was first discovered. 20 Our whole country was granted
by the Crown while in the occupation of the Indians. No objec-
tion was made to a grant on the ground that title as well as posses-
sion was in the Indians when it was made and that it passed nothing
on that account. 21 However, the rights of the original inhabitants
were in no instance entirely disregarded. To a considerable extent
their rights were necessarily impaired but they were admitted to
be the rightful occupants of the soil with a legal as well as a just
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion. On the other hand their rights to complete sovereignty
as independent nations were necessarily diminished. Nor could they
dispose of the soil at their own will to whomsoever they pleased since
the original fundamental principle was that discovery gave exclusive
title to those who made it.2
2
Consequent upon the American Revolution all the rights of the
Crown and of Parliament vested in the several states,23 for when
the Revolution took place the people of each state became sovereign
themselves.2 4 The rights which the states acquired in the tidelands
and marginal seas were through the people of each state in their
19. Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 579, 580
(U. S. 1823).
20. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 409 (U. S. 1842).
21. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 579 (U. S. 1823).
22. Id. at 574.
23. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).
24. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (U. S. 1842).
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sovereign capacity. In this capacity the people of each state hold
the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under
them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since
surrendered through the Constitution to the general government.25
At common law the title and the dominion of lands flowed by the
tide were in the king for the benefit of the nation. Upon the Ameri-
can Revolution these rights, charged with a like trust, were vested
in the original states within their respective borders.2 6 The doc-
trines of the common law as to the seashore and the soil lying un-
der tidewaters and navigable streams were peculiar. The funda-
mental idea was that the property in the sea and tidewaters, and
in the soil and shore thereof, was in the sovereign.2 7 The sovereign
owned, as far as it was capable of ownership, the sea and by virtue
of this he owned the shores and arms thereof; but his title, jus pri-
vatum, was held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of navi-
gation and fishing.
28
It is clear that the tidelands and shore were acquired by the states
by conquest.2 9 How far seaward their acquisition went is not free
from doubt but that it did extend seaward beyond the tidelands and
the shore for some distance is certain. The difficulty appears when
an attempt is made to show specifically at what point the sovereign
control terminated. From the earliest time it has been conceded that
the sovereignty of nations bordering on the sea does not stop at the
shore, but that for some distance at least it extends over and under
the ocean. Such control has been regarded as necessary for the se-
curity of those living on the coast and as proper to assure the full
enjoyment by them of the land which they inhabit. By the Ameri-
can Revolution dominion over these waters became vested in the
several states and there it still remains except in so far as they have
surrendered such control to the Federal Government through the
Constitution.3 0
There is authority holding that the minimum limit of the territorial
jurisdiction of a nation over tidewaters is a marine league from its
coast 31 and in time of war and for enforcement of revenue laws
authority may be exercised beyond a marine league.32  The Act of
25. Ibid.
26. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 57 (1894) ; St. Clair County v. Loving-
ton, 23 Wall. 46 (U. S. 1874).
27. State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. 50 (1884).
28. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 13 (1894).
29. Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co., 32 Fed. 9 (C. C. D. N. J. 1887).
30. State v. Ruvido, 297 Me. 102, 15 A. 2d 293 (1940).
31. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 258 (1891).
32. Ibid.
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Congress admitting Florida to the Union made one of its boundaries
the Gulf of Mexico. Under international law this means that the
jurisdiction of the state extends one league into the Gulf or three
miles.83 The jurisdiction of a state over the sea adjacent to its
coast is that of an independent nation with the exception of those
rights granted to the Government by the Constitution. 4 Within
what are generally recognized as the territorial limits of states by
the law of nations, a state can define its boundaries on the sea.
3 5
The sovereignty of a state over its territorial waters exists even
though the state has never seen fit to define the extent of its marine
boundary.30 A state may extend its borders for the space of one
marine league from low watermark and make the region so annexed
as much a portion of the state as any other part of its territory. If
that portion of the high seas which lies within a marine league of a
nation's coast is territorially appropriated by such nation, then such
portion is within a particular state or district.3 7 With the approval
of Congress a state may fix its boundaries.3 8 With such approval
Alabama extended hers into the sea.3 9
Whatever soil below low watermark that is the subject of exclusive
ownership belongs to the state on whose maritime border and within
whose territory it lies, subject only to any lawful grants of that
soil by the state or the sovereign power which governed its territory
before the Declaration of Independence.40 The state's power over
this soil results from the ownership of the soil, from the legislative
jurisdiction of the state over it, and from its duty to preserve un-
impaired those public uses for which the soil is held. 41 In determin-
ing the extent of the territory of the United States under the Eigh-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution, the United States Supreme
Court said that it was the regional areas - of land and adjacent waters
- over which the United States claims and exercises dominion and
control as a sovereign power. The Court said that the immediate
33. Pope v. Blanton, 10 Fed. Supp. 18, 21 (D. C. N. D. Fla. 1935). Dis-
missed by the United States Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction, 229 U. S.
521 (1937).
34. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 264 (1891).
35. Ibid.
36. State v. Ruvido, 297 Me. 102, 15 A. 2d 293 (1940).
37. United States v. Newark Meadows Imp. Co., 173 Fed. 426, 429 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1909).
38. See note 33 smpra.
39. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 230 (U. S. 1845).
40. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71, 74 (U. S. 1855).
41. Id. at 75.
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context and the purport of the entire section2 show- that the term
is used in a physical and not a metaphorical sense -that it refers
to areas or districts having fixity of location and recognized boun-
daries. The Court further stated that it was then settled in the
United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject
to its jurisdiction includes the land area under its dominion and con-
trol, the ports, harbors, bays, and other enclosed arms of the sea ex-
tending from the coast line outward a marine league or three geo-
graphic miles.43
Thus it is seen that a state bordering the sea has territory extend-
ing a minimum of a marine league seaward and that although the
state holds this area subject to the public rights pointed out above
its jurisdiction and control of it is not limited thereby, for the juris-
diction of a state is co-extensive with its territory - co-extensive with
its legislative power." The rights of a state in this area are not
limited to regulatory powers over fishing, as was pointed out by
the United States Supreme Court:
The Maritime belt is that part of the sea which, in contradis-
tinction to the open sea, is under the sway of the riparian states,
which can exclusively reserve the fishery within their respective
maritime belts for their own citizens, whether fish, or pearls,
or amber, or other products of the sea. 45
A state's boundary on the sea is not necessarily limited to a marine
league seaward but in order for it to extend its boundary beyond that
point there is apparently required the consent of Congress. 48
II.
TITLI AND INTEREsTS ACQUIRED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
All rights in and claims to territory of the original thirteen states
by the Government must be made by virtue of the Constitution.
The several states, not the United States, won independence from
42. Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manu-
facture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United .States and all terri-
tory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby pro-
hibited.
43. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 27 A. L. R. 1306 (1923).
44. Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 386
(U. S. 1818).
45. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1 (1906).
46. Skdriotes v. State, 144 Fla. 220, 197 So. 736 (1940). But on appeal the
Supreme Court did not decide the question of Florida's marine boundary.
Sldriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 (1941).
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England. There was no territory within the United States that was
claimed in any other right than that of some one of the confederate
states; therefore, there could be no acquisition of territory made by
the United States distinct from or independent of some one of the
states.47 The United States acquired nothing by way of cession from
England by the Treaty of 1783. That treaty has been viewed only as
a recognition of pre-existing rights and on that principle the soil and
sovereignty within the acknowledged limits of the original states were
as much theirs at the Declaration of Independence as in 1827.48 There
were strong attempts to claim vacant lands and lands to which the
title was in dispute as belonging to the Government and the contests
long threatened the dissolution of the Confederation. 49 Even the
Articles of Confederation contained a proviso that no state could
be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States. The
issue was finally settled by declaring that the boundaries of the
United States were the external boundaries of the several states and
that the United States did not acquire any territory by the Treaty of
Peace in 1783.50
All rights acquired from the states by the Government are covered
in the Constitution. The tenth section of the first article to the Con-
stitution5 l is employed altogether in enumerating the rights surren-
dered by the states and the clearness and brevity with which this is
done make it clear that not a single superfluous word was used or
words which meant merely the same thing.5 2 What was retained by
the states was very aptly stated by Chief justice Marshall in Sturges
v. Crowminshield:53
47. Harcourt v. Gaillard, 12 Wheat. 523, 526 (U. S. 1827).
48. Id. at 527.
49. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 729 (U. S. 1838).
50. Ibid.
51. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,
or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts,
laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury
of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Con-
troul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage,
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, un-
less actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
52. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 570 (U. S. 1840) (Equally divided
court).
53. 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819).
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When the American people created a National Legislature,
with certain enumerated powers, it was neither necessary nor
proper to define the powers retained by the States. These powers
proceed not from the people of America, but from the people
of the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the
Constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may
be abridged by that instrument.
The states retained the right of independent nations to settle dis-
puted boundaries subject only to the consent of Congress.54
Although the Government could make treaties with the Indians
the states did not lose title to their land whereon Indian reservations
were located.55 Neither did the states lose any territory by the
granting of admiralty jurisdiction to the Government. It is not
questioned that whatever may be necessary to the full and unlimited
exercise of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is in the Government
of the Union. Congress may pass all laws which are necessary and
proper for giving the most complete effect to this power. Still, the
general jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant of power,
adheres to the territory as a portion of sovereignty not yet given
away.56
The territory acquired by the Government by cession from the
original states, by treaty, and by discovery was held in trust for cer-
tain purposes. The Government's rights were different in this ter-
ritory from the rights of the states in their territory. The United
States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right
of soil in and to the territory of which Alabama or any of the new
states were formed except for temporary purposes and to execute
the trusts created by the acts of the Virginia and Georgia Legislatures
in the deeds of cession executed by them to the United States, and
the trust created by the Treaty with the French Republic, of 1803,
ceding Louisiana.5 7 When the United States accepted the cession
of territory they took upon themselves the trust to hold the munici-
pal eminent domain for the new states and to invest them with it to
the same extent in all respects that it was held by the states ceding
the territories. 58 The right of eminent domain' over the shores
and the soils under the navigable waters for all municipal purposes
belongs exclusively to the states within their respective territorial
54. Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185, 209 (U. S. 1837).
55. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 1810).
56. United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 388 (U. S. 1818).
57. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 221 (U. S. 1845).
58. Id. at 222.
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juri~dictions and they alone have the constitutional power to exercise
it.59 The shores of navigable waters and the soil under them were
not granted by the Constitution to the United States but were re-
served to the states respectively.60 The same rule applied to land
acquired from Mexico. 6 ' The reservations to the Government of
public lands in territory thus acquired did not apply to tidelands be-
cause the term "public lands" did not include tidelands.6 2  Rights
and interests in the tideland, which is subject to the sovereignty of
the state, are matters of local law.63 In applying the doctrine to the
states of the northwest the Supreme Court recognized that the state's
sovereignty extended seaward beyond the tidelands when it said
through Mr. Justice Brandeis:
The state, being the absolute owner of the tidelands and of
the waters over them, is free, in conveying tidelands, either to
grant them rights in the adjoining water area, or to completely
withhold all such rights.
64
The new states admitted into the Union since the adoption of the
Constitution have the same rights as the original states in the tide-
waters and in the lands under them within their respective jurisdic-
tions.6 5
III.
WHAT THE UNITED STATES CLAIMS UNDER THE CALIFORNIA,
LOUISIANA, AND TEXAS CASES
As near a definition of what the United States claims in the mar-
ginal seas as has been found is in Mr. Justice Black's decision in
the California case :66
The crucial question on the merits is not merely who owns
the bare legal title to the lands under the marginal sea. The
United States. here asserts rights in two capacities transcend-
ing those of a mere property owner. In one capacity it asserts
the right and responsibility to exercise whatever power and do-
minion are necessary to protect this country against dangers to
59. Id. at 230.
60. Ibid.
61. Borax Consolidated v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U. S. 10, 15 (1935).
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id. at 22.
64. Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington Railroad, 255 U. S. 56, 63
(1921).
65. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 57 (1894).
66. See note 2 supra at 29.
9
Blanton: Water and Watercourses-Soil under Marginal Seas of the United Sta
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
NoTms
the security and tranquility of its people incident to the fact
that the United States is located immediately adjacent to the
ocean. The Government also appears in its capacity as a mem-
ber of the family of nations. In that capacity it is responsible
for conducting United States relations with other nations. It
asserts that proper exercise of these constitutional responsibili-
ties requires that it have power, unencumbered by state com-
mitments, always to determine what agreements will be made
concerning the control and use of the marginal sea and the land
under it.
Briefly stated, the two capacities in which the United States asserts
rights in the marginal sea are: 1. The responsibility (and the right
- for neither exists without the other) of protecting this country
against foreign dangers; and 2. The responsibility of conducting in-
ternational affairs. Basically the two are the same. With the basis
for the Government's claim thus determined, two logical questions
follow: 1. Has the Government made out its case to show the
necessity for maintaining these actions in order to enable it to exe-
cute its acknowledged responsibilities; and 2. Do the rights claimed
by the states in the marginal seas interfere with the Government's
proper execution of these acknowledged responsibilities? Assuming
the affirmative answer to these two questions, a third question arises:
Are these two responsibilities of the Government peculiarly adapted
to the marginal seas or are they applicable to the shore and upland
as well ?
In the California case the Government alleged that it is the owner
in fee simple of or possessed of paramount rights in and power over
the lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the Pacific
Ocean; lying seaward of the ordinary low watermark on the coast
of California and outside of the inland waters of the State; extend-
ing seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the north and south
respectively by the northern and southern boundaries of the State of
California.6 7 The complaint in the Louisiana case is a repeat of the
one in the case of California except the distance seaward is the
same as the boundaries claimed by Louisiana, extending seaward
twenty-seven marine miles and bounded on the east and west re-
spectively by the eastern and western boundaries of the State of
Louisiana. 68 The pattern is followed in the case of Texas: extend-
ing seaward to the outer edge of the continental shelf and bounded
67. See note 2 supra at 22.
68. See note 3 supra at 701.
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on the east and southwest respectively by the eastern boundary of the
State of Texas and the boundary between the United States and
Mexico,69 again corresponding to the marine boundaries claimed by
Texas.
It should be noted that at the outset the Government acknowledges
that the land claimed in the case of California is bounded on the north
and south by California's boundaries; and in the case of Louisiana
the land claimed is bounded on the east and west by Louisiana's
boundaries; and in the case of Texas the land claimed is bounded
on the east and southwest by the boundaries of Texas. It then fol-
lows that the territory claimed by the Government is within the
States of California, Louisiana, and Texas. The Government also
limits its claim in each instance to the same distance seaward that is
claimed by the state as being within its boundary.
The Court did not adopt the Government's contention that the
Government had title to or owned the lands in dispute. Instead, it
stated that "the issue in this class of litigation does not turn on title
or ownership in the conventional sense" 70 and that the Government
was not to be deprived of its interests by "ordinary court rules." 7 '
It decided that California is not the owner of the. three-mile marginal
belt along its coast, and that the Federal Gqvernment rather than the
state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident
to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that
water area, including oil.72 The Government does not need title to
this land under the marginai sea if paramount rights in and power
over the belt gives it rights greater than and including those of a
"mere property owner." This leaves unanswered the question of
who, if not the Government, has the title. Title to all land submerged
or not must rest somewhere, either in the state as sovereign or in
the riparian owners, subject only to the declared trust as to naviga-
tion.73 If not on title, on what does the Government base its claim?
The United States has no constitutional capacity to exercise muni-
cipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits
of a state or elsewhere except in the cases in which it is expressly
granted. 74 The Court does not show where the express grant to
the Government of the marginal sea bed came from. When the
Government denies ownership in the state it denies its own rights,
69. See note 4 supra at 709.
70. See note 3 supra at 704.
71. See note 2 .tpra at 39.
72, Ibid.
73. Angelo v. Railroad Commission, 194 Wis. 543, 217 N. W. 570, 574 (1928).
74. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (U. S. 1845).
11
Blanton: Water and Watercourses-Soil under Marginal Seas of the United Sta
Published by Scholar Commons, 1953
Nours
for, as pointed out above,75 there can be no ownership of and in-
terests in these areas by the Government other than through the states.
This attitude of the Court toward the title to the marginal sea lands
prompted one writer to say:
The Supreme Court of the United States is just what its
name suggests. It is Supreme, but it is only a court. It is not
above the law. Any opinion of that or any other court to the
contrary notwithstanding it always has been, still is, and ever
will be the law (until we cease to live under a democratic form
of government) that a title formally conveyed to a person or a
state remains in that person and his heirs or in the state and
its successors until it is conveyed out.
7 6
The Court says that the matter of state boundaries has no bearing
on the present problem.7 It is submitted that this is the crux of the
problem.78 Although it denies state ownership of the marginal sea
bed, the Court admits the states have legislative and regulatory
powers in the three-mile belt for certain purposes79 but it makes no
attempt to reconcile this holding with the one laid down by the same
Court one hundred and thirty-five years ago that a state's territory,
legislative power and jurisdiction are co-extensive.80 In effect the
Court says the state's jurisdiction extends beyond its territory. In
conceding that California has been authorized to exercise local police
power functions in the part of the marginal sea belt uithin its de-
dared boundaries,81 the Court again acknowledges the disputed area
to be within that state's boundaries. On the other hand, when the
Court says that the state was authorized to act within its own boun-
daries by the Government it raises the question as to when, how, and
by what authority the Government authorized the state to exercise
local police power functions in this area. The Constitution granted
the Federal Government no authority to authorize the states of the
Union to exercise any powers. A state needs no authorization to
exercise its powers. The thirteen original states obtained their several
powers by the strong arm and the sword; their powers are exercised
in the highest right known, sovereignty. The Government is a crea-
75. See notes 36, 37, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 56, supra.
76. 35 M-Ass. L. Q. 1, 9 (1950).
77. See note 3 supra at 704.
78. See notes 31-45 inclusive supra.
79. Tommer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313
U. S. 69 (1941).
80. See note 56 supra.
81. See note 2 supra at 36.
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol5/iss3/5
SOUTH CAROLNA LAW QuARTERLY
ture 6f the original thirteen states with only certain delegated powers.8 ?
It has long been settled that the police powers belong to the states.
Therefore, it is difficult to understand how the Government could
authorize the states to exercise powers it cannot itself exercise. As
pointed out above,8 3 states subsequently admitted to the Union came
in on an equal footing. Upon the acquisition of a territory by the
United States, whether by cession from one of the states or by
treaty with a foreign country or by discovery and settlement, the
same title and dominion passed to the United States as the original
states had. This title and dominion was held by the United States
for the benefit of the whole people and in trust for the several states
to be ultimately created out of the territory.84 Upon the creation
of a new state the Government relinquished all the powers it had held
in trust and it then stood in the same relation to the new state that
it did to the original states, Furthermore, for the Government to,
authorize a state to exercise power in a field which by the Constitu-
tion is delegated to the Government or prohibited to the state would
be as destructive of our federal structure, as conceived by the creators
ot our Government, as would be a state's authorization for the Gov-
ernment to exercise powers reserved to the, state.
In discussing these powers that a state admittedly has, the Court
held state legislation regulating fishing rights in the marginal seas
to be valid in the absence of conflicting federal legislation8 5 or
assertion of federal power 86 or conflicting federal policy.8 7 If the
Government has merely to assert power or evolve a new or different
policy in any area or direction, without regard to its limits under the
Constitution, to usurp a state's sovereignty, the Government can
eventually emancipate itself from its intended limits set by the Con-
stitution. A government by policy cannot be substituted for govern-
ment by law under the Constitution and our federal system remain
intact. Clearly it was this assertion of federal power, spoken of by
the Court, on which the Government based its claim to the bed of
the marginal seas because there was no federal legislation claiming
the oil or other resources of the marginal sea bed. On the contrary,
Congress rejected proposed legislation sponsored by the Executive
82. U. S. Const. Amend. X: The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.
83. See notes 57-65 inclusive supra.
84. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 57 (1894).
85. See note 79 supra.
86. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 393 (1948).
87. See note 3 supra at 704.
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Department to claim submerged lands containing oil off the coasts
of this country as an oil reserve for the Navy.8 8 However, there
has been no lack of Congressional action since the California decision
seeking to reinstate the status quo and it appears likely that such a
result will be achieved in the near future.8 9 On this point it might
be noted that in regard to this legislation the popular expression is
to return the disputed lands to the states.90 It is not to be suggested
or even intimated, however, that the Court's decision should have
been influenced by Congressional legislation relative to the marginal
sea beds or by lack of such legislation.
The Court said the thirteen original colonies never acquired owner-
ship in the marginal sea 91 but it does concede that they did acquire
elements of sovereignty of the English Crown by their revolution
against it.92 Prior to her admission to the Union Texas was a Re-
public. As a Republic she had not only full sovereignty over the
marginal sea but ownership of it, the land underlying it, and all the
rights which it held.93 In other words Texas became an independent
Republic through her revolution from Mexico but the thirteen colonies
who attained their independence in the same manner through their
revolution from England acquired less than Texas did. As shown
above,94 the original states were vested with all the rights of the
Crown and Parliament upon the Revolution, not merely "elements"
of those rights.
In discussing the three-mile rule the Court said that the rule
is but a recognition of the necessity that a government next to the
88. See 2 LA. L. Rnv. 252 (1940) (Discusses proposed legislation).
89. At least three such bills were introduced on the opening day of Congress
this year and others since: H.R. 629, H.R. 636, H.R. 641, H.R. 1062. The last
listed is typical of those submitted and would confirm and establish titles of
the states to lands beneath navigable waters within state boundaries. New
legislation has been introduced in the Senate also: S. 294 (by Senator Price
Daniel of Texas, who, as Attorney General, argued Texas' case before the
Supreme Court in 1950), S. J. Res. 13, S. 107-this is a compromise bill
which would give the Government control of submerged lands beyond the three-
mile limit with joint state and federal ownership of the three-mile zone itself;
with the Government receiving roughly two-thirds of any benefits derived from
this area.
Another bill, H.R. 1931, has been introduced which would set aside President
Truman's Executive Order giving the submerged oil lands to the Navy. In
this regard it is to be noted that the new Secretary of the Navy, Robert B.
Anderson, is an oil man from Texas.
For an article briefly summarizing the legislative history of the off-shore
lands (two pages) see the Congressional Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 4, page 126
(JLn. 1953).
90. N. Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1952, p. 34, col. 4.
91. See note 3 supra at 704.
92. See note 2 supra at 31.
93. See note 4 supra at 717, 718.
94. See note 23 supra.
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sea must be able to protect itself from dangers incident to its loca-
tion. It must have powers of dominion and regulation in the interest
of its revenue, its health, and the security of its people from wars
raged on or too near its coasts. And in so far as the nation asserts its
rights under international law, whatever of value may be discovered
in the seas next to its shore and within its protective belt will most
naturally be appropriated for its use.9 5 The Court here acknowledges
the three-mile rule and the principles which brought it about but
denies that these principles ever applied to the original states. From
the foregoing it seems to follow that the Government may initiate
an action in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against
a state regarding ownership of land, assert rights under international
law as between the two, not litigate title to land in the "conventional
sense" and not be bound by "ordinary court rules." Such was not
the concept of the same Court at an earlier day when it said that a
nation acquiring territory by treaty or otherwise must hold it subject
to the constitution and laws of its own government. 9 6 If the Court
has established a new doctrine then our federal system is subservient
to international law.
If the original states never had these rights to the marginal seas
which the Government claimed, how and when did the Government
acquire them? The nearest answer that is found comes from the
Court's statement that "acquisition" of the three-mile belt has "been
accomplished." '97  In referring to the origin of the three-mile rule
the Court states that when this nation was formed the idea of a
three-mile belt over which a littoral nation could exercise rights of
ownership was but a nebulous suggestion; that neither the English
charters98 granted to this nation's settlers, nor the Treaty of Peace
95. See note 2 supra at 35.
96. Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 225 (1845).
97. See note 2 supra at 34.
98. The following are extracts from some of the English charters. They will
be found in THORPE, American Charters, Constitutions, and Organic Laws,
at the pages indicated:
Letters Patent to Sir Humphrey Gylberte (1578): The grant in the new
world read: "... With all commodities, jurisdictions, and royalties both by
sea and land . . . with the rites, royalties and jurisdiction, as well marine as
other.. ." (page 49).
Charter to Sir Walter Raleigh (1584) : The charter was to: " The said
Walter Ralegh, his heires and assigns, and euery of them, shall haue holde,
occupie, and enioye to him, his heires and assignes, and euery of them for euer,
all the soile of all such lands, territories, and Countreis, so to bee discouered
and possessed as aforesaide, and of all such Cities, castles, townes, villages,
and places in the same, with the right, royalties, franchises, and jurisdictions,
as well marine as other within the saide lands, or Countreis, or the seas
thereunto adioyning . . ." (page 53). The grantees were authorized to de-
fend their settlements for a distance of 200 leagues (page 54).
The First Charter of Virginia (1606) : ". . . From the same fifty Miles
15
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with England, nor any other document to which it had been referred,
showed a purpose to set apart a three-mile ocean belt for colonial
or state ownership.99 Although there has not been unanimity among
nations over the centuries regarding the three-mile rule, it was more
than a nebulous suggestion as will be seen from the following:
Grotius laid down the doctrine that territorial rights extended
over as much of the sea as could be defended from-the shore.
Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book II, Chap. 3, Secs.
13-14. Other tests have been suggested but this general prin-
ciple has remained dominant through the centuries. In 1703
Bynkershoek fixed the limit as a marine league or three miles
from coast, a distance which was then the range of cannon
shot .... In spite of the lengthening range of artillery this has
remained the test generally applied to the present day.' 00
The Government stressed that it did not seriously assert its increas-
ingly greater rights in this area until after the formation of the
every way on the Sea Coast, directly into the main Land by the Space of one
hundred like English Miles . . ." (page 3784). In this charter all islands with-
in 100 miles of the coast were included also.
The Second Charter of Virginia (1609) : All the "... said Territories, and
the Precincts thereof, whatsoever, and thereto, and thereabouts both by Sea and
Land, being, or in any sort belonging or appertaining . . ." (page 3796).
The Third Charter of Virginia (1611-1612): This charter enlarged the pre-
vious charter, expanding the grant seaward: .... Within the said Tract of
Land upon the Main, and also within the said Islands and Seas adjoining what-
soever and thereunto or thereabouts both by Sea and Land being or situate
." (page 3804).
Sir Robert Heath's Patent (1629): "... Fishings of all sorts of fish,
whales, sturgeons & of other Royalties in the sea or in the rivers . . . with
Royall rights & franchises whatsoever as well by sea as by land.. ." (page 70).
This document is the one which named the territory in the new world that be-
came Carolina. However, the terms "Carolina," "Carolana," "New Carolana,"
"Province of Carolana," are all used with the name Carolana" being used most
frequently (page 71, et seq.).
Charter of Carolina (1663) : This charter was granted upon the basis that
the prior patent to Sir Robert Heath had been forfeited by reason of failure
to exercise the patent. The holders under this charter were not satisfied with
the validity of the charter in view of the prior patent to Heath, which opinion
was more or less shared by the King of England. The heirs of Heath were
prevailed upon to release their claims to Carolina (some land in what is now
the middle Atlantic states was given to them as satisfaction in part or in whole),
whereupon a new Charter of Carolina was granted with more or less the same
wording but generally enlarging the grant of 1663. (Copy of charter on page
2744.)
Charter of Carolina (1665): "... With the fishings 6f all sorts of fish,
whales, sturgeons, and all other royal fish, in the sea, bays, islets and rivers,
within the premises, and the fish therein taken, together with the royalty of
the sea upon the coast. . . (page 2762).
Constitution of North Carolina (1776): North Carolina claimed within its
boundaries "all the territories, seas, waters, and harbours with their appur-
tenances.. ." (page 2789).
99. See note 2 supra at 32.
100. State v. Ruvido, 297 Me. 102, 15 A. 2d 293 (1940).
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Unidn; that it has not bestowed any of these rights upon the states
but has retained them as appurtenances of national sovereignty. 10 '
Tjhe implication is- that the Government asserted its rights, but not
seriously so, prior to the formation of the Union. This writer is
at a loss as to how that could be. What is meant by "increasing"
rights? If, as the Court says, the idea of a three-mile belt was but
a nebulous suggestion when the nation was formed then it did not
acquire any rights upon formation. The Government acquired
nothing, yet it increased. Normally an increase of nothing is no in-
crease at all. If the original states did not acquire ownership of
the marginal sea, as the Court says, what is meant by the Govern-
ment's "greater" rights in this area? If the Government has greater
rights it follows that the states have lesser rights but rights nonethe-
less. What these rights of the states are is not disclosed by the
Court. How soon after the formation of the Union the Government
began to assert power in the marginal sea is stated by the Court
as follows: "Until the California oil issue began to be pressed in
the thirties, 02 neither the states nor the Government had reason to
focus attention on the question of which of them owned or had para-
mount rights in or power over the three-mile belt."' 03 If that be
the case, and it appears to be, then this is the answer to the argu-
ments made by the Government and followed by the Court. The
Government's claim is not then based on the need to protect itself
from dangers incident to its location and for the security of its people
from wars raged on or too near its coasts, as the Court originally
stated, but rather on the fact that oil was found under the marginal
sea. If these rights as claimed by the Government are necessary
for the purposes claimed why was there no assertion of rights prior
to the thirties? Is the nation's need for protection greater now than
prior to the thirties? It seems strange that the question arose dur-
ing a period when this nation was not engaged in war and was not
litigated until its most extended war had been concluded over a
decade later. No contention was made that absence of the privilege
of exercising these rights during the recent war impaired the na-
tion's ability to wage war, when, admittedly, these rights now claimed
Jby the Government were being exercised exclusively by the states.
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, this is not a situation where
101. See note 2 supra at 31.
102. See note 88 supra.
103. See note 2 supra at 39.
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an exercise of national power is actively and presently interfered
with.1 04
Since, admittedly, no claim to this area was made by the Govern-
ment until very recent years, what of the long exercise of jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty over this area by the states? The Court's
answer is that even assuming that Government agencies have been
negligent in failing to recognize or assert the claims of the Govern-
ment at an earlier date, the great interests of the Government in this
ocean area are not to be forfeited as a result; and officers who have
no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by
their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their
acquiescence, laches, or failure to act. 10 5 If this rule is to be applied
in future contests .between the Government and the states then no
claim of a state- to- its property is secure and may be claimed by the
Government when a new policy so directs. In contests between states
regarding boundaries the Court has followed a long established atti-
tude that as between the States of the Union long acquiescence in
the assertion of a particular boundary and the exercise of dominion
and sovereignty over the territory within it should be accepted as
conclusive, regardless of what the international rule might be in re-
spect to the acquisition by prescription of large tracts of country
claimed by both. 106 In one such case the Court said:
Such acquiescence in the assertion of authority by the State
of Kentucky, such omission to take any steps to assert her
present claim by the State of Indiana, can only be regarded as
a recognition of the right of Kentucky too plain to be overcome,
except by the clearest and most unquestioned proof. It is a
principle of public law universally recognized, that long acquies-
cence in tMe possession of territory and in the exercise of do-
minion and sovereignty over it, is conclusive of the nation's title
and rightful authority.10 7 (Emphasis added.)
It is to be noted that the Court uses the law applicable to nations
when discussing state boundary disputes. As stated above, 103 the
states are considered as independent nations where boundary dis-
putes are concerned subject only to Congressional consent. It would
seem that the authority quoted above would be applicable in these
marginal sea cases also.
104. See note 2 supra at 44 (Dissent).
105. See note 2 supra at 39.
106. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 53 (1906).
107. Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479, 510 (1890).
108. See note 54 supra.
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IV.
CONCLuSIoN
The dispute over the marginal sea beds should never have arisen
in the Court. Who is sovereign de jure or de facto of a territory is
not a judicial but a political question the determination of which by
the legislative and executive departments of any government con-
clusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, dtizens and
subjects of that government. 109 The Court does not base its de-
cision on the Government's exclusive sovereignty for it says:
The question here is not the power of a State to use the mar-
ginal sea or to regulate its use in [the] absence of a conflicting
federal policy; it is the power of a State to deny the paramount
authority which the United States seeks to assert over the area
in question . . . . The marginal sea is a national, not a State
concern. National interests, national responsibilities, national
concerns are involved. The problems of commerce, national de-
fense, relations with other powers, war and peace focus there.
National rights must therefore be paramount in that area.110
But it also says the "equal footing" clause prevents extension of
the sovereignty of a state into a domain of political and sovereign
power of the United States."' How this view can be reconciled
with the holding that a state has jurisdiction in the marginal sea
for certain purposes is not understood. If a state has any jurisdic-
tion at all it is exercised in its capacity as political sovereign. There-
fore, to say that its sovereignty is less in the marginal sea than else-
where within its boundaries is to divide its sovereignty into degrees
of lesser and greater. This result impairs the equal footing doctrine
itself because sovereignty denotes uniformity of political capacity
within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. If one state's political
sovereignty lacks this uniformity then it does not have equal footing
with other states in the capacity of political sovereign.
This all boils down to the assertion by the Government that in
order for it to exercise its political sovereignty as a member of the
family of nations it must have absolute control and dominion of the
marginal sea. Here again the Court is at variance with an earlier
opinion in this regard which said there is neither the authority of
law nor reason for the position that boundaries between nations or
109. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
110. See note 3 supra at 704.
111. See note 4 supra at 720.
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states is any more a political question than any other subject on
which they may contend." 2 The Court does not show how the
Government's obligations as a nation require greater powers in the
marginal sea than elsewhere. The state could not in any way deny
or impair paramount authority in the Government in the exercise
of its political functions in this respect. The treaty-making power
is not subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution on the
power of Congress to enact legislation, and treaties may accordingly be
made which affect rights exclusively under the control of the states.
113
State ownership of the marginal sea bed would not interfere in any
way with the needs or rights of the United States in war or peace.
The power of the United States is plenary over these undersea lands
precisely as it is over every river, farm, mine and factory of the
nation.
14
Claiming the resources of the marginal sea bed is asserting pro-
prietary interests, not political interests. The question of how the
Government acquired those proprietary interests is raised by the
dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the answer, if any, is fur-
nished in the same paragraph. The Government's acquisition of its
proprietary interest "has not been remotely established except by
sliding from absence of ownership by California to ownership by
the United States."115 Whether this sliding interest doctrine has
solely marine characteristics or whether it could become amphibious,
or yet shed its marine attributes altogether and inhabit the upland,
is not shown by the Court. Under the decisions of these three cases,
if followed, the Government could assert the same rights to the up-
lands and the reasoning applied in the instant cases would be just
as applicable because laxity in assertion of the Government's rights
would be no bar to its claim. Neither would the question of the
state's title or right to use the uplands be the issue but rather the
issue would be the same as here; the power of a state to deny the
paramount authority which the United States seeks to assert over
the area in question. In justification of the Government's assertion
of these proprietary interests the Court says this is an instance where
property interests are so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty
as to follow sovereignty. 116  By the same token the wheat fields of
112. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 737 (U. S. 1838).
113. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920); 11 A. L. R. 984; 134
A. L. R. 886.
114. See note 2 supra at 42 (J. Reed's dissent).
115. See note 2 sitpra at 45.
116. See note 4 supra at 719.
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Kansas could be so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to
follow sovereignty.
"Stripped of legal paraphernalia the decision of the California
case sharply focuses the conflict in authority, powers, rights and
duties between the dual sovereignties that are the American govern-
ment. The fear of our statesmen a century ago that the state govern-
ments would be 'the rival power of the federal government' has now
inverted to the fear of the power and supremacy of the dominant
federal government. The decision in the California case is but a
step removed from the nationalization of our oil industry. Presump-
tively, other natural resources, necessary for the defense of this coun-
try are likewise only one step removed from federal control."11 7
"There can be little doubt but that it [California: case] holds con-
tra to the intimations of all previous holdings of the same court
and the rules laid down by the highest courts of the individual
states . . "118
"In a sense the problem, created by the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. California, is typical of our time. It arose be-
cause the Court declined to follow legal principles, established over
a period of about one hundred and fifty years, which required recog-
nition of title in the states. In this the action of the Court is an
example of a current tendency not to look for a solution of prob-
lems in the spirit of those of a prior generation, giving appropriate
consideration to the Constitution and to the traditional role of the
states in the federal union; instead, the tendency is to seek a solution
on the basis of expediency and of expansion of federal power to
an extent incompatible with established concepts of the American
federal structure ...
"The true basis of the California case, therefore, is not a rule of
law but is expediency. Since the doctrine of paramount right and
authority cannot be applied to internal affairs without violating our
basic ideas of property and even of social organization, it must be
only the justification of the decision rather than the legal theory
logically requiring it. In a sense, however, the decision is in line
with the trend of the Court to disregard the binding force of legal
precedent and to decide constitutional issues from a fresh view-
point."1 19
In addition to declaring that the states were not owners of the
marginal sea lands the Court took the opportunity to weaken the
117. 19 Miss. L. J. 265, 289 (1948).
113. 3 Miami L. Q. 339 (1949).
119. 24 Tulane L. Rev. 51 (1949).
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holdings of prior decisions relative to the tidelands as can be seen
from the following:
The Government does not deny that under the Pollard rule, as
explained in later cases, California has a qualified ownership
of lands under inland navigable waters such as rivers, harbors,
and even tidelands down to the low watermark. It does ques-
tion the validity of the Pollard Case that ownership of such
water areas, any more than ownership of uplands, is a neces-
sary incident of the state sovereignty contemplated by the "equal
footing" clause. . . If this rationale of the Pollard Case is
a valid basis for a conclusion that paramount rights run to the
states in inland waters to the shoreward of the low watermark,
the same rationale leads to the conclusion that national interests,
responsibilities, and therefore national rights are paramount in
waters lying to the seaward in the three-mile belt.
120
Just what is meant by a "qualified" ownership is not clear. The
Court's refusal to apply the tideland and inland navigable water
rule to the marginal sea is difficult to understand. As mentioned
above,12 the common law as to tidelands and navigable waters was
peculiar. This peculiar law was applied to the Great Lakes and in-
land navigable waters which the rule at common law did not cover.
The Court now refuses to apply the rule to the sea from whence it
came. Note the clear and precise language used by the Court in
Hardin v. Jordan12 relative to this rule:
With regard to grants of the government for lands bordering
on tide-water, it has been distinctly settled that they only ex-
tend to high-water mark, and that the title to the shore and lands
under water in front of lands so granted inures to the State
within which they are situated, if a State has been organized
and established there. Such title to the shore and lands under
water is regarded as incidental to the sovereignty of the State -
a portion of the royalties belonging thereto and held in trust
for the public purposes of navigation and fishery - and cannot
be retained or granted out to individuals by the United States....
Such title being in the State, the lands are subject to State regu-
lation and control, under the condition, however, of not inter-
fering with the regulations which may be made by Congress
with regard to public navigation and commerce.
120. See note 2 supra at 30, 36.
121. See note 27 mpra.
122. 140 U. S. 371, 381, 382 (1891).
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This right of the States to regulate and control the shores of
tide-waters, and the land under them, is the same as that which is
exercised by the crown in England. In this country the same
rule has been extended to our great navigable lakes, which are
treated as inland seas, and also, in some of the States, to navi-
gable rivers, as the Mississippi, the Missouri, the Ohio, and, in
Pennsylvania, to all the permanent rivers of the State; but it
depends on the law of each State to what waters and to what
extent this prerogative of the State over the lands under water
shall be exercised.
"The principle has long been settled in this court that each state
owns the beds of all tide waters within its jurisdiction, unless they
have been granted away. In like manner the states own the tide
waters themselves, and the fish in them, so far as they are capable
of ownership while running. For this purpose the state represents
its people, and the ownership is that of the people in their united
sovereignty . . . . The right which the People of the State thus
acquire comes not from their citizenship alone, but from their citizen-
ship and property combined. It is, in fact, a property right, and not
a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship.,
"The planting of oysters in the soil covered by water owned in
common by the people of the State is not different in principle from
that of planting corn upon dry land held in the same way. Both
are for the purposes of cultivation and profit; and if the state, in the
regulation of its public domain, can grant to its own citizens the ex-
clusive use of dry lands, we see no reason why it may not do the same
thing in respect to such as are covered by water."
1 23
It would seem that the same rule applicable to state regulation of
the oyster industry in marginal sea waters would be applicable to
extracting oil deposits from the same sea bed.
If future cases arise concerning the marginal seas of the original
states those states will likely receive the treatment dealt Texas through
the application of the ecual footing doctrine; that is, since the Court
has decided the states in the instant cases have no ownership of the
marginal sea, no other state may have ownership of the marginal sea
bed and remain equal to those other states bordering the sea which
the Court has decided do not have such ownership. Neither will the
states have an opportunity to present all phases of the issue, as was
demonstrated by the summary treatment by the Court in the Texas
123. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877); followed in The Abby
Dodge v. United States, 223 U. S. 166 (1912).,
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case. Because these cases arise in the original jurisdiction of the
Court it would seem that an exhaustive analysis of all aspects of the
question should be considered.
A fitting summary of the Court's holding is found in Mr. Justice
Ffrankfurter's dissent :124
Considerations of judicial self-restraint would seem to me far
more compelling where there are obviously at stake claims that
involve so many farreaching, complicated, historic interests, the
proper adjustments of which are not readily resolved by the
materials and methods to which this Court is confined.
It might be thought that a discussion of these cases at this time
might prove to be academic in view of the recent nation-wide elec-
tions and the announced attitude of the new President regarding
ownership of the lands under marginal seas. However, it is believed
that to so treat the subject is to fail to see the forest for the trees.
Even if the Congress enacts legislation renouncing federal claims to
the marginal sea lands such legislation will not weaken the basis for
the Court's holding in these three cases. The Court could, in the
future, infer that in the absence of Congressional legislation to the
contrary the United States has "paramount rights in and power
over" every segment of the nation's resources, animate and inanimate.
As long as the principles laid down in the instant cases stand, there
exists the possibility that they will be used as a springboard for ex-
pansion of the sliding interest doctrine, if sfich it may be called.
Hoovim C. BLANTON.
124. See note 2 supra at 46.
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